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Editorial Comments
Judicial Authority in WTO
Law: A Commentary on the
Appellate Body's Decision in
China-Rare Earths
Julia Ya Qin *
1. The recent decision of the World Trade Organization's Appellate Body (AB) in
China-Rare Earths1 has put an end to the high-profile disputes over China's policies
to restrict the exportation of rare earths and other raw materials. China has lost the
case, and is expected to remove the export restrictions in compliance with the WTO
decision. Despite resolution of the disputes, however, the AB's decision has failed to
clarify a systemic issue at the heart of the disputes, namely, the relationship between
the WTO agreements on one hand, and an accession protocol whose provisions
modify the application of the WTO agreements to the acceded Member, on the
other. In addition, the AB chose not to address the dissenting opinion from the
Panel below and the views of several third parties that disagreed with the AB's prior
ruling on the same legal issue in China-RawMaterials,2 thereby forgoing the opportun-
ity to reexamine and possibly reverse its controversial ruling. The AB's decision thus
raises some serious issues about judicial authority in WTO law.
I. Background
2. The Rare Earths case was brought by the United States, the European Union and
Japan in March 2012, challenging China's use of export duties and quotas on rare
earths, tungsten and molybdenum as inconsistent with WTO law. The complainants
Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School, U.S.A.; Tsinghua University
School of Law, China; Editor of this Journal.
1 AB Reports, China-Rare Earths, WIT/DS431, 432, 433/AB/R (7 August 2014).
2 AB Reports, China-Raw Materials, WIT/DS394, 395, 398/AB/R (30 January
2012).
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charged that China's measures breached its commitments to eliminate export duties
under Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol, and violated Article XI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which prohibits all quantitative
restrictions on exports. In defense, China invoked the general exceptions under
GATT Article XX(b) and (g), which excuses measures necessary to protect public
health or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
3. China is the world's largest producer and exporter of rare earths, a key input for
many high-tech and strategic products. Production of rare earths is highly polluting.
For years, China mined and processed the minerals with little regard for environmental
protection, resulting in massive pollution in the mining regions as well as rapid deple-
tion of rare-earths resources. Today, China supplies 95% of the global demand, even
though it has only 30% of the world's known reserves. Desiring to conserve natural
resources and strengthen environmental protection, but not to hinder development
of domestic downstream industries, the government resorted to export restrictions so
as to reduce foreign consumption. This policy, however, is inconsistent with the
WIO rulings in Raw Materials, which became effective in February 2012, requiring
China to treat foreign and domestic users evenhandedly in the distribution of its raw
materials. (It should be noted that WTO law generally allows a Member to restrict
exports by customs duties; but since China agreed to eliminate export duties in its Ac-
cession Protocol, it has forgone this right. 3)
4. The main issues in RareEarths are almost identical to those in Raw Materials. As in
Raw Materials, the key question concerning export quotas was whether China's mea-
sures met the requirements of Article XX, an evidentiary matter mostly. The Panel
answered the question in the negative, and the Panel's ruling was upheld by the Appel-
late Body on appeal. Also as in RawMaterials, the key question concerning export duties
was whether China may invoke GATTArticle XX to defend a breach of its commitment
under Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. Following the AB's ruling in RawMate-
rials, the majority of the Panel found that GATT Article XX is not applicable to Para-
graph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol. But one Panelist disagreed and filed a
dissenting opinion on the issue. The Panel ultimately concluded that, even assuming
GATT Article XX was available to Paragraph 11.3, China did not demonstrate that
its use of export duties met the requirements of Article XX.
5. On appeal, the central issue for Chinawas the applicability ofGATTArticle XX to
Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. This is a pure legal issue that had already been
decided once by the Appellate Body in Raw Materials. Although in theory WIO
dispute settlemet rulings are binding only on the parties to a particular dispute, in prac-
tice the Appellate Body has treated its decisions as defacto binding precedents. Absent
3 See Julia Ya Qin, The Predicament of China's "WIO-Plus" Obligation to Eliminate
Export Duties: A Commentary on the China-Raw Materials Case, 11 Chinese JIL
(2012) 237-246.
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"cogent reason", the AB held, "an adjudicatorybody will resolve the same legal question
in the same way in a subsequent case". 4 Reluctant to challenge a precedent directly,
China did not appeal the majority Panel's finding. Instead, it sought to clarify the sys-
temic relationship between the WIO agreements and the provisions of its Accession
Protocol generally. To that end, China advanced a number of new arguments purport-
ing to show that GATT Article XX is applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession
Protocol. All of China's arguments were rejected by the Appellate Body.
II. Disagreement with the Appellate Body's Ruling
6. In contrast with China's circumspect approach, the dissenting Panelist and several
third parties participating in the case argued plainly that GATT Article XX should
be applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol, thus openly disagreeing
with the Appellate Body's decision. This is a remarkable fact given the defacto binding
status of the AB rulings.
What is also remarkable is how opinions on this issue had shifted within a relatively
short period of time. When China invoked Article XX to defend its breach of Paragraph
11.3 in Raw Materials, the panel was unanimously opposed, and none of the third
parties supported China's position. Barely two years later, the Rare Earths proceedings
witnessed one Panelist and several third parties siding with China on the issue. At the
appellate stage, four out of the eight third parties that expressed views on this issue
(Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, and Russia) supported the position of China and of
the dissenting Panelist, with a fifth (South Korea) advocating the need to examine
the record of China's accession negotiations in order to answer the question properly. 5
Thus, the majority of the third parties that spoke on the issue favored a reconsideration
of AB's prior ruling.
7. This major shift of opinion among the participating Members, however, is not
surprising. As previously commented in the pages of this Journal,6 the AB's ruling
that GATT Article XX is not applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Proto-
col is highly problematic. Paragraph 11.3 prescribes China's obligation to eliminate
export duties, which is a "GATT-plus" obligation since the GATT explicitly permits
a Member to levy export duties.7 China's Accession Protocol does not contain any
4 AB Report, US-Stainless Steel from Mexico, WT/DS344/AB/R (30 April 2008),
para. 160.
5 See AB Reports, China-Rare Earths, paras. 2.218-2.243. There were altogether 16
third parties participating in Rare Earths, and eight of them (Australia, India, Indo-
nesia, Oman, Peru, Taiwan, Turkey, and Vietnam) did not express any view on the
issue. The three countries opposing China's position were Canada, Norway and
Saudi Arabia.
6 Supra note 3.
7 GATT Article XI: 1.
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general exceptions of its own, and is silent as to whether the general exceptions of GATT
Article XX is available to China's GATT-plus obligations. The question confronting
the WTO judges, therefore, was how to interpret this silence. Instead of examining
the inherent relationship between China's export duty obligations and the GATT pro-
visions, theAB focused only on the express words of Paragraph 11.3 and selected provi-
sions in the Working Party Report on China's accession, and reached the following
conclusion (AB Reports, Raw Materials, para. 306):
In the light of China's explicit commitment contained in Paragraph 11.3 to elim-
inate export duties and the lack of any textual reference to Article XX of
the GATT 1994 in that provision, we see no basis to find that Article XX
of the GATT 1994 is applicable to export duties found to be inconsistent with
Paragraph 11.3.
The AB's narrow textualist interpretation is inconsistent with the customary rules
of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT), which require a treaty interpreter to take into account
broad contexts of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose when interpreting
specific terms of the treaty. The AB's interpretation is also inconsistent with the "hol-
istic" approach that it has advocated for the interpretation of W\TO provisions.
8
Legally, the AB's ruling has created an irrational state of affairs in -WTO law: while
the most important obligations of the WTO, such as the most-favored-nation
(MFN) and national treatment obligations, are all subject to public policy exceptions,
a specific commercial commitment of China is not. Normatively, the AB's ruling
stands for the undesirable position that, short of an explicit textual reference, a
trade-liberalization obligation will trump the values ofpublic health and environmen-
tal protection as a matter of -WTO law.
8. The AB's ruling in Raw Materials has since met with much criticism. 9 In Rare
Earths, the dissenting Panelist authored a 20-paragraph separate opinion, analyzing
comprehensively why Article XX and all other general exceptions of GATT should
8 See e.g., AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, WI/DS269, 286/AB/R (12 September
2005), para. 176 (stating that interpretation pursuant to the VCLT rules is "ultimately
a holistic exercise").
9 E.g., Marco Bronckers & Keith E. Maskus, China Raw Materials: A Controversial
Step Towards Evenhanded Exploitation of Natural Resources, 13(2) World Trade
Rev. 393 (2014); Matthew Kennedy, The Integration of Accession Protocols into
the WTO Agreement, 47(1) J. World Trade 45 (2013); Elisa Baroncini, The Applic-
ability of GATT Article XX to China's WIO Accession Protocol in the Appellate
Body Report of the China-Raw Materials Case: suggestions for a different interpretive
approach, 1(3-4) China-EU LJ 1 (2013); Bin Gu, Applicability of GATTArticle XX
in China-Raw Materials: A Clash within the WIO Agreement, 15(4) JIEL 1007
(2012); Qin, supra note 3.
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be automatically available to China's obligation under Paragraph 11.3.10 The dissent-
ing Panelist and the several third parties in this case all recognized the inherent relationship
between Paragraph 11.3 and the GATT provisions and emphasized the fundamental im-
portance of the policy exceptions to the WTO system. Hence, they were of the view that,
unless China explicitly waived its right to invoke the GATT policy exceptions, such excep-
tions should be available to China's obligation on export duties.
9. Regrettably, instead of seizing the opportunity to reexamine its previous decision,
the Appellate Body saw "no reason to revisit" the ruling since China did not directly
challenge it. (AB Reports, para. 5.65) It then conveniently ignored all the opposing
arguments of the third parties, and dispensed with the entire opinion of the dissenting
Panelist in a single footnote." That said, the Appellate Body apparently felt the need to
recalibrate its approach in Raw Materials, as it stated:
[E]xpress textual references, or the lack thereof, to a covered agreement (such as
the GATT 1994), a provision thereof (such as ... Article XX ofthe GATT 1994),
or "the WIO Agreement" in general, are not dispositive in and of themselves.
(AB Reports, para. 5.61, emphasis original)
This statement seems a far cry from the conclusion reached in Raw Materials quoted
above. Having made this statement, however, the Appellate Body went on to claim
that its ruling in Raw Materials was made "on the basis of a holistic analysis of all ele-
ments" (AB Reports, para. 5.63), thus effectively reaffirming its previous decision.
III. Relationship between WTO Agreements and Accession
Protocols
10. Much of the confusion over the applicability of the GATT general exceptions to
China's accession commitments stems from the lack of a clear understanding on the
systemic relationship between China's Accession Protocol and the WTO agreements.
In WTO practice, an accession protocol effectively serves two functions. One is to
enable the applicant to accede to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement or the Marrakesh Agreement), to which
the GATT and other trade agreements (collectively the "Multilateral Trade
10 Panel Reports, China-Rare Earths, WT/DS431, 432, 433/R (26 March 2014),
paras. 7.118-7.138.
11 AB Reports, fn. 504. The note, which is to paragraph 5.68 that dismisses China's ar-
gument on the "intrinsic relationship" between specific provisions of its Accession
Protocol and WIO provisions, reads as follows: "For these reasons, we also see no
basis for the opinion of the dissenting panelist in these disputes that 'the defences pro-
vided in the GATT 1994 are automatically available to justify any GATT-related obli-
gations, including border tariff-related obligations - unless a contrary intention is
expressed by the acceding Member and WIO Members'. Indeed, the Appellate
Body rejected arguments by China to this effect in China - Raw Materials".
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Agreements") are annexed. The other is to stipulate special terms that will apply to the
relationship between the acceding country and other Members under the WTO Agree-
ment. These special terms may elaborate, expand or modify the provisions of the Multi-
lateral Trade Agreements. The accession protocol also declares that it is "an integral part
of the WIO Agreement". It is unclear, however, how a special term of the accession
protocol should be "integrated" into the WIO Agreement and what such integration
may entail. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to define the precise nature
of the accession protocol and its relationship with the other agreements within the
'Y(/O legal framework. Because the accession documents contain little explanation
on these foundational issues, the burden falls upon the treaty interpreter.
11. Thus far, the WIO judiciary has not clarified these foundational issues. In the
several disputes involving China's Accession Protocol, the Appellate Body never dis-
cussed the precise nature or status of the protocol within the WTO treaty framework.
As a result, it has not been able to properly define the relationship between the protocol
provisions and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which has led to problematic juris-12
prudence. In Rare Earths, China specifically requested the AB to clarify the systemic
relationship between its Accession Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In
response, the Appellate Body conducted an "integrated assessment" on such relation-
ship, and its conclusions are summarized below (AB Report, para. 5.57):
(a) Just as the Multilateral Trade Agreements are an integral part of the Marrakesh
Agreement, and thereby, of the single package of WIO rights and obligations,
so too is China's Accession Protocol an integral part of the same package.
(b) Like the approach to ascertaining the relationship among provisions of the
Multilateral Trade Agreements, the specific relationship between the provisions
of China's Accession Protocol, on the one hand, and the provisions of the
Marrakesh Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, on the other
hand, must be examined on a case-by-case basis through a proper interpretation
of all relevant provisions. Neither obligations nor rights may be automatically
transposed from one part of the legal framework into another.
(c) The question of whether the exceptions under the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments may be invoked to justify a breach of a particular protocol provision
must also be answered on a case-by-case basis, and be ascertained through a
12 For instance, in China-Publications, WT/DS363/AB/R (21 December 2009), the
AB overlooked the GATT provisions on state trading as the relevant treaty context for
China's trading rights obligations under its Accession Protocol. Consequently, it mis-
stated the way in which China's measures at issue may become "\WO-consistent",
and erroneously declared a judicial standard for identifying the linkage between
trade and traders while such linkage is manifestly established by the GATT provisions
on state trading. For detailed analysis, see Julia Ya Qin, Pushing the Limits of Global
Governance: Trading Rights, Censorship and WIO Jurisprudence - ACommentary
on the China-Publication Case, 10 Chinese JIL (2011) 271, 295-299.
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thorough analysis of the relevant provisions on the basis of the customary rules
of treaty interpretation, as well as the circumstances of each dispute.
In short, the Appellate Body was of the view that the relationship between China's Ac-
cession Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is not different from the rela-
tionship among the Multilateral Trade Agreements, since they are all "integral parts" of
the WTO Agreement.
12. From this basic position, the Appellate Body dismissed all of China's arguments.
China had contended that specific provisions of the accession protocol should be
treated as integral parts of one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, depending on
the subject matter to which they "intrinsically relate". The AB rejected this argument
on the grounds that China did not provide "a clear definition" of the "intrinsic relation-
ship" test and that China's position "sits uncomfortably with our interpretation that
rights and obligations cannot be automatically transposed from one part of the WTO
legal framework to another". (AB Reports, para. 5.68) China also sought to differentiate
its Accession Protocol from the Multilateral Trade Agreements, arguing that unlike
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, its Accession Protocol is not a "self-contained
agreement , since it does not include most of the important features that many of
the Multilateral Trade Agreements possess, such as proper general exceptions, security
exceptions, or a modification clause. The Appellate Body dismissed the term "self-
contained agreement" as not being "an apt descriptor" of any of the agreements con-
tained in the integrated WTO framework. Within the single package of WTO rights
and obligations, the Appellate Body opined, whether an instrument can be character-
ized as a self-contained agreement is of "limited relevance". (AB Reports, para. 570)
13. None of the above reasons offered by the Appellate Body is persuasive. The fact
that an accession protocol is made an integral part of the WTO Agreement does not
mean it must be integrated into the WTO legal framework in the same manner and
on the same legal basis as the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Unlike the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, which were concluded simultaneously to provide the substantive
disciplines of the WTO, the accession protocol is by nature a legal instrument for
the WTO to admit a new member. The purpose of the instrument is to integrate the
acceding country into the WTO system so that it will abide by the substantive disci-
plines of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In practice, this instrument has evolved
into a substantive agreement that can prescribe additional rules applicable to the acced-
ing country only. These country-specific rules may elaborate, expand or deviate from
the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and their scope and contents
vary from country to country, depending on the outcome of particular accession nego-
tiations. Regardless of its coverage, however, the accession protocol is not designed to
provide a coherent new discipline. Instead, it is structured to address subjects across
the entire spectrum of the WTO legal framework, all in the context of the particular
conditions of the acceding country. In other words, the accession protocol provides
special terms on the application of the Multilateral Trade Agreements to the acceding
country. As such, the provisions of the protocol cannot be understood independently
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from the general disciplines of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Given the particular
nature, purpose and design of the accession protocol, its integration into the WTO
Agreement can only be effectively achieved through the interaction between its specific
provisions and the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements that address the
same subject matter.
14. Notably, China also submitted that its Accession Protocol is properly character-
ized as a "subsequent agreement" relating to the same subject matter in the sense of
Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly, China con-
tended, to the extent that specific provisions of its Accession Protocol conflict with
the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the protocol provisions will
prevail to the extent of the conflict. Pointing to Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol
and GATTArticle XI: 1, China explained that, pursuant to VCLTArticle 30(3), GATT
Article XI: 1 has been modified by Paragraph 11.3, so that China can no longer freely
impose export duties under Article XI: 1. The Appellate Body again dismissed China's
argument as not "comporting well" with its previously stated views. 13 Without
further explanation, the Appellate Body stated: "we do not consider Article 30(3) of
the Vienna Convention to be apposite for understanding the relationship between the
different components of this single package of rights and obligations, all of which
form part of'the same treaty' towhich China acceded in 2001". (AB Reports, para. 5.70)
15. This summary dismissal ofVCLT Article 30(3) as inapposite for understanding
the relationship between the accession protocol and other components of the WIO
Agreement may prove too hasty. VCLT Article 30, Application ofSuccessive Treaties Re-
lating to the Same Subject Matter, provides rules for determining the rights and obliga-
.... 14
tions ofstate parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter. Pursuant
13 According to the AB, China did not elaborate the concepts underlying its argument.
AB Reports, para. 5.70.
14 Article 30 Application of Successive Treaties Relating to the Same Subject Matter:
(1) Subject to Article 103 of the Charterof the UnitedNations, the rights and obliga-
tions of States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall
be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs.
(2) When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as in-
compatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail.
(3) When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the
earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the
earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with
those of the later treaty.
(4) When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3;
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the
treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual
rights and obligations.
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to Article 30(3), when all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty
but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation, "the earlier treaty
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later
treaty". This provision embodies the doctrine of lex posterior. It recognizes that the
parties to a treaty may enter into a subsequent treaty that effectively modifies the
earlier treaty. Article 30 covers not only the situation where the parties to the two treaties
are identical, but also the situation where there are additional parties to the later treaty.
Pursuant to Article 30(4)(b), when the parties to the later treaty do not include all the
parties to the earlier one, "as between the States parties to both treaties and a State party
to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their
mutual rights and obligations". This provision is understood to cover both the situation
where the additional party is only to the earlier treaty and the situation where the add-
itional party is only to the later treaty.
15
16. VCLT Article 30 applies to the relationship between the WTO Agreement (in-
cluding the Multilateral Trade Agreements annexed thereto) and each subsequent
agreement concluded within the WIO legal framework. An accession protocol is
such a subsequent agreement - it is a treaty concluded between an acceding country
and the WTO representing all incumbent Members, 16 and its terms define the appli-
cation of the WIO Agreement between the acceded Member and other Members.
Since the accession protocol does not provide a general rule of conflict, the principles
of VCLT Article 30(3) and (4) become applicable. Pursuant to those principles, as
between the acceded Member and other Members, the protocol provisions shall
prevail to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of the WTO Agree-
ment; but to the extent the provisions of the WIO Agreement are compatible with the
protocol, the existing WIO provisions shall apply.
17. To illustrate, as China pointed out, Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Proto-
col is inconsistent with GATTArticle XI, as it obligates China not to use export duties
whereas GATTArticle XI explicitly permits such use. Pursuant to VCLTArticle 30(3),
Paragraph 11.3 shall prevail over Article XI to the extent of such inconsistency. Thus, as
15 Ali Sadat-Akhavi, Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2003), at 64; Malgosia Fitzmaurice & Olufemi Elias, Contemporary
Issues in the Law of Treaties (Eleven International Publishing, 2005), p. 322.
16 Technically, VCLT does not govern the WIO accession protocols, as it applies to
treaties between States only. Rules governing agreements between a State and an inter-
national organization are set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
between States and International Organizations or between International Organiza-
tions (21 March 1986) (VCLTIO), U.N. Doc. A/ CONF. 129/15. VCLTIO has not
entered into force. Since VCLTIO contains nearly identical rules as VCLT, including
the provisions on the application of successive treaties relating to the same subject
matter in Article 30 of VCLTIO, and to the extent the VCLT rules have attained
the status of customary international law, these rules apply to all subjects of inter-
national law, including international organizations.
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between China and other Members, GATTArticle XI: 1 has been effectively modified
to the following effect:
Subject to Paragraph 11.3 of Chinai Accession Protocol, [n]o prohibitions or
restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective
through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted
or maintained by any Member on the importation of any product of the territory
of any other Member or on the exportation or sale for export of any product des-
tined for the territory of any other Member. (Modification in italics)
This modified version of Article XI: 1 demonstrates how the provision of Paragraph
11.3 of China's Accession Protocol is effectively "integrated" into the WTO
Agreement.
18. The modification of Article XI: 1 by Paragraph 11.3, however, does not affect
Article XX or any other exceptions available to Article XI:1. That is because the
general exceptions of Article XX are not incompatible with the content of Paragraph
11.3, just as these exceptions are not incompatible with Article XI: I or any other
GATT obligations.17 Pursuant to VCLTArticle 30(3), therefore, Article XX shall con-
tinue to apply to Article XI: 1, as modified by Paragraph 11.3.
19. The above example shows that VCLT Article 30(3) not only is "apposite", but
also is indispensable, for understanding the relationship between specific provisions
of the accession protocol and those ofthe Multilateral Trade Agreements. In dismissing
VCLTArticle 30(3) as inapposite, the Appellate Body apparently overlooked the need
to resolve inconsistencies between the provisions of the accession protocol and those of
the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Without first identifying and resolving such incon-
sistencies, however, it is impossible to interpret the accession protocol and other com-
ponents of the WTO Agreement as the "single package of rights and obligations" in a
coherent manner.
20. In sum, when assessing the relationship between China's Accession Protocol and
the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the Appellate Body focused only on their common-
ality of being "integral parts" of the WTO Agreement, but ignored the specific nature,
purpose and design that make the protocol distinct from the Multilateral Trade Agree-
ments. Having ignored the distinct characteristics of China's Accession Protocol, the
Appellate Body was not to recognize that the protocol interacts with the Multilateral
Trade Agreements in a very different manner from the interaction among the Multilat-
eral Trade Agreements and that VCLTArticle 30 contains the key to understanding the
17 As the dissenting Panelist in Rare Earths duly pointed out, the provisions of the GATT
policy exceptions "strike a balance between the policy space governments enjoy to
pursue legitimate objectives and their obligations under the GATT 1994". And
"the fundamental importance of the flexibilities" provided in GATTArticle XX is "in-
controvertible", in light of the purpose and objective of the WIO embodied in the
preamble of the WIO Agreement. Panel Reports, Rare Earths, para. 7.137.
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systemic relationship between the accession protocol and the \WTO agreements. Con-
sequently, the Appellate Body was unable to clarify such relationship or provide any
meaningful guidance on how to analyze it, except to say that such relationship must
be determined on "a case-by-case" basis.
IV. Legitimacy of WTO Judicial Authority: Need for
Self-Correction
21. The end result of the Rare Earths case was this: China has been finally denied the
right to avail public policy exceptions to its obligations on export duties. The Appellate
Body's rulings on this issue are difficult to defend, whether as a matter of treaty inter-
pretation or WIO policy. The rulings may also have adverse implications for other
acceded Members. As a party to the disputes, China is legally bound by these
rulings. However, decisions of such problematic nature cannot help but tarnish the
reputation of the WTO judicial authority.
22. A more important question arising from this case, therefore, is whether WTO
judicial interpretations can be reexamined and modified. After all, the members of
the Appellate Body are not infallible. The growing number of cases appealed, the in-
creasing complexity of the issues involved (such as the novel challenge of interpreting
the large gaps in China's Accession Protocol), and the very short timeline (90 days)
imposed on the appellate review have all contributed to the chance of ill-considered
decisions being made by the appellate judges.
23. By design, the system does have a mechanism to check the decisions of its judi-
ciary. Pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement, it is the Ministerial Conference
and the General Council that shall have "the exclusive authority to adopt interpreta-
tions" of the WIO provisions. In contrast, panels and the Appellate Body are
charged with the task to "clarify the existing provisions" of the \WTO agreements in
accordance with the customary rules of treaty interpretation, and their findings and
recommendations "cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in
the covered agreements".1 8 Thus, in theory the Ministerial Conference or the
General Council can overrule an AB ruling by issuing an authoritative interpretation
of its own. In practice, however, the WTO "legislative" has never exercised this
power. Given the current paralysis of its negotiation functions, the chance that the
WO legislative issues an "authoritative interpretation" is practically nonexistent.
Against this political reality, the only hope that the system can rectify a judicial error
lies in the willingness of the Appellate Body to self-correct.
24. Thus far, the Appellate Body has not shown any sign of the willingness to do so.
In its 19-year history, the AB has never admitted committing any legal error. As noted
above, to defend its problematic ruling in Raw Materials, the AB went so far as to claim
18 WIO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), articles 3.2 and 19.2.
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that its ruling was based on "a holistic analysis of all elements", a claim that cannot be
backed up by its report.
25. The unwillingness of the Appellate Body to admit that it may have made a
mistake or has changed its mind on a given issue is baffling. As the defacto top judicial
organ of the WIO,1 9 the Appellate Body has the power and authority not only to set a
precedent, but also to change a precedent as it sees fit. Apparently, when stating that
"absent cogent reason, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in
the same way in a subsequent case"2O _a statement made in the context of admonishing
a panel for not following AB's prior ruling on the same issue - the AB contemplated at
least the possibility that it may one day depart from its previous decisions. Although
what constitutes a "cogent reason" in the eye of the AB remains to be seen, one
would think the need to correct mistakes should count as one such reason.
26. The justification for treating the AB decisions as defacto binding precedents
is the desirability of "consistency and stability" in the interpretation of \WTO
provisions, which the AB deemed as "essential" for promoting "security and predict-
ability" in the WIO dispute settlement, as contemplated by Article 3.2 of the
Dispute Settlement Understanding. 2 1 Indeed, consistency of jurisprudence is valued
in both municipal and international legal systems, as consistency of law is one of the
basic requirements of the rule of law.22 Yet, consistency is not an end in itself. It is
instead a means to ensure that the law will develop in a principled fashion so as to
serve the ideal of the system. Thus, as Judge Tanaka of the International Court of
Justice once noted:
23
[T] he requirement of the consistency ofjurisprudence is never absolute. It cannot
be maintained at the sacrifice of the requirements of justice and reason. The
Court should not hesitate to overrule the precedents and should not be preoccu-
pied with the authority of its past decisions. The formal authority of the Court's
decision must not be maintained to the detriment of its substantive authority.
Therefore, it is quite inevitable that, from the point of view of the conclusion
or reasoning, the minority in one case should become the majority in another
case of the same kind within a comparatively short space of time.
19 According to DSU article 17.14, an Appellate Body report "shall be adopted" by the
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and "unconditionally accepted by the parties to the
dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report."
The negative consensus requirement ensures that an AB report will always be adopted
in practice.
20 Supra note 4.
21 Ibid., paras. 160-161.
22 See Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (rev. ed. 1969), p. 39.
23 Barcelona Traction, Separate Opinion of Judge Tanaka, ICJ Reports 1964, at 63.
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27. In this regard, it is instructive to refer to the practice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, whose decisions enjoy the formal status of stare decisis. During the period
from 1810 to 1992, the Supreme Court in 204 cases overruled in whole or in part more
than 300 of its own decisions. Ofthe 204 cases, 52 overruled the decisions made within
the previous five years, including 25 that overruled the decisions entered within the pre-
vious two years or less. 24 The Court has long held that stare decisis is "a principle of
policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision". Helvering
v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940). This is particularly true in constitutional
cases "where correction through legislative action is practically impossible". Burnet
v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 407 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In
such cases, the sooner the Court can self-correct, the better it is for society, as there
will be less time to create reliance on the erroneous positions. The basic attitude of
the Court towards its own mistakes is reflected in these words of Justice Brandeis:
"The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recog-
nizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropri-
ate also in the judicial function". Ibid.
28. As in the US constitutional cases, correction of judicial interpretation through
legislative action is practically impossible at the -WTO. Under such circumstances,
like the US Supreme Court, the WIO Appellate Body has the institutional responsi-
bility to engage in self-correction and to do so when the first opportunity presents
itself Having decided more than one hundred cases in 19 years, the Appellate Body
is well positioned to acknowledge and rectify past mistakes. It is one thing to let its
jurisprudence gradually evolve along an intelligible path. It is quite another to allow
major interpretive errors stay uncorrected and become part of the WTO acquis. The
willingness of the Appellate Body to self-correct is essential for maintaining its substan-
tive authority, on which also rests the legitimacy of the WIO dispute settlement system.
24 Source: U.S. Government Printing Office, Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by
Subsequent Decision, Constitution of the United States ofAmerica: Analysis, and In-
terpretation - 1992 Edition, at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/
content-detail.html.
